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Emmanuel Lazega and Olivier Favereau1
This book asserts that economists and sociologists need the combined
concepts of conventions and structures to deal with markets and organizations.
We argue that there is room for cooperation between the two disciplines when
economists take into account conventions, and sociologists structures and
flows of resources. Conventions refer to values, rules and representations that
influence economic behavior.2 Structures refer to patterns of interests and rela-
tionships reflecting resource interdependencies among members of any social
system.
At first sight, the relationship between conventions and structures is obvi-
ous. On the one hand, for example, the principle of reciprocity (as described by
sociologists such as Mauss or Gouldner) can be conceived of as a convention.
This convention may influence, for example, whom members of an organiza-
tion approach for advice. In effect, one might think that members approach
others with the most expertise, but very often this is not what happens: because
they probably cannot give anything in return (or because they do not want to
recognize these othersÕ status, or because they do not want to be perceived as
inexperienced), they often approach people who are at a similar level, who may
not know more about this special subject than they do, but for whom, at some
point in the future, they will be able to return the favour. The rule of reciproc-
ity will informally determine in part the shape of advice flows in the organiza-
tion, and thus the structural opportunities and constraints weighing on
membersÕ productive abilities. On the other hand, structural features of a collec-
tive actor also influence the assertion or definition of rules. The shape of inter-
dependence among members, especially asymmetric interdependence called
status or power, also defines membersÕ capacity to decide what is fair and what
is unfair in the distribution of efforts and allocation of rewards.
However, the relationship between these two dimensions of economic
activity (whether production or exchange) is not really spelled out in current
social sciences. Both mainstream economics and new institutional economics
feel rather uneasy about rules and values, because of their strong notion of
instrumental rationality (either optimizing or bounded); symmetrically struc-
turalist sociology is at pains to give a high analytical status to individual and
collective representations, because of a traditional holistic bias.
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The project of this book is to study whether it is not only possible but indis-
pensable to combine some sort of structural sociology (in terms of networks)
and some sort of institutional economics (in terms of conventions) in order to
improve our understanding of coordination, be it organization-like or market-
like. This study, in spite of its systematic character, is still only a challenge.
For it to be successful, and to prevent amateurism on both sides, real affinities
between these research programmes should lead to statements about covari-
ance between changes in structures and changes in conventions. Empirical
progress resulting from this convergence being still virtual, exchanges will
remain at the theory level. We have first to introduce our views of structural
sociology and institutional economics, before surveying the content of each
chapter, in two steps: didactic, then exploratory.
HOW ARE CONVENTIONS AND STRUCTURES 
RELATED IN A BROADLY CONCEIVED STRUCTURAL
SOCIOLOGY?
What is a Broadly Conceived Structural Sociology?
A broadly conceived structural approach to social life can be summarized by
five characteristics.3 The first is that it combines an understanding of the inter-
ests of actors themselves with that of their organization as a whole, thus bridg-
ing the levels of individual and collective action. It does so by looking at the
organization as a small political community.4 Information on interactions and
relationships between members is used as information on their resource inter-
dependencies, derived power relationships and coordination efforts. The
second characteristic, one that separates it from earlier and narrower forms of
structuralism, is its capacity to look jointly at economic and symbolic activi-
ties. Saying that actors use their resource interdependencies as a source of
power presupposes a form of rationality that includes costÐbenefit calcula-
tions, but also symbolic activity such as appropriateness judgments (based on
previous investments in relationships, recognition of identities, identifications
to reference groups and the use of various forms of authority arguments)
allowing individuals to politicize their exchanges and controls. ActorsÕ politi-
cization has two combined but potentially conflicting dimensions: niche seek-
ing and status competition, both based on selections of, or investments in,
relationships. A memberÕs social niche can be defined as a relational context,
or subset of other members in the organization, with whom this member
commits him/herself to exchange many different types of resources at a rela-
tively lower cost, an advantage that can be called Ôbounded solidarityÕ. As
strategic and interdependent entrepreneurs, these individuals also compete for
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status: they try to concentrate resources in their own individual hands so as to
benefit from a position of strength when negotiating terms of exchange (that
is, bartering) within and outside their quasi-groups.
These (realistic) assumptions about membersÕ strategic rationality lead to a
third characteristic of a broadly conceived structural approach. As mentioned
above, it bridges the individual and collective levels of action by thinking in
terms of multi-level social mechanisms. Examples of such mechanisms
provided in previous research include generalized exchange (a form of bounded
solidarity based on the existence of cycles of indirect reciprocity among
selected colleagues), lateral control (a form of early monitoring and sanction-
ing of deviant conduct that both spreads and concentrates the costs of control)
and regulatory change (a form of ÔconstitutionalÕ redefinition of the rules of the
game that is driven by members with multiple forms of status). By taking such
social mechanisms into consideration, this approach combines both individual
costÐbenefit reasoning and explanations of stable participation in collective
action, or cooperation. The fourth characteristic of this approach is its use of
network analysis as a method for looking at the relational dimensions of these
social mechanisms, at their consequences, at the ways in which niche seeking
and status competition are combined, managed or prevented from getting out
of hand. As suggested by standard definitions of multiplexity, cooperation and
coordination are not understandable without complex social relationships and
interdependencies as components of such processes. Network analysis is partic-
ularly well suited here, because it analyses systematically the ways in which
members politicize their exchanges and controls, that is, the ways in which they
select their partners when they transfer and exchange many types of produc-
tion-related resources, and resulting interdependencies.
Finally, the fifth characteristic of a broadly conceived structural theory Ð one
that is more to the point for the purpose of this book Ð is its account of collec-
tive actorsÕ built-in dependence on cultural, that is, normative, processes.
Saying that status provides a position of strength to define terms of exchanges
is equivalent to saying that it helps define or select the values, norms and rules
from which such terms are consciously or unconsciously derived. In early
structural sociology, the conceptual relationship between relational structures,
on the one hand, and rules, norms and values, on the other hand, has been
elusive. In narrow structural approaches, resource interdependencies, more
than norms, were considered the only principle of social order. Our approach,
however, aligns itself with a more Weberian (1920; see also Swedberg, 1998)
and institutional perspective when it emphasizes the interpenetration of the
interactional and normative realms in order to explain social change or stabil-
ity. Institutional theories of action have long stressed organizational values,
norms and rules as restraints on grabbing economic behaviour and brutal exer-
cise of power. Such values are debated, contested and permanently redefined
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by members. Organizations change in part because they can redefine their
formal and informal rules (Reynaud, 1989). This institutional level of organi-
zation was explicitly formulated by many sociologists (Merton, 1959; Parsons,
1956) and by studies of political or micropolitical efforts, by competing inter-
ests, to change the rules. Such efforts may or may not be successful, and social
arrangements are often stable enough to hide such underlying contests. But
structural analysis can help in identifying them.
Specifically, two notions combine a structural and an institutional perspec-
tive: SelznickÕs idea (1957) of Ôprecarious valuesÕ and the notion of Ômulti-
status oligarchsÕ. A value is precarious because it is always in danger of losing
its flag carriers and representatives; that is, the active support by organized
interest groups and elites that help preserve it as a candidate for top priority on
the list of all competing values. ÔMulti-status oligarchsÕ are precisely the
members of a collective with enough status to redefine priorities between
precarious values and derived policy options. Indeed, regulatory changes need
the support of members with several forms of status. These oligarchs must
have the capacity to promote regulatory changes and deal with the negative
effects of broken promises induced by social change. Particularly when differ-
ences in power are not huge among members, this capacity often rests on
sacrifice of resources by such multi-status oligarchs, and on the legitimacy
obtained from such sacrifices. Those who can afford to give up resources for
the common good while not losing power are people who have several incon-
sistent forms of status. Thanks to this inconsistency, or loose coupling, losing
one form of status does not entail losing another. Multi-status oligarchs can
thus drive change (the redefinition of rules) while staying in power.
In effect, the connection between structure and culture as theorized by
Selznick (1957) through the notion of precarious value is useful because any
regulatory process Ð or process of redefinition of rules governing the collec-
tive Ð is a form of change that involves broken promises in the redistribution
of resources (Reynaud and Reynaud, 1996). When the rules of the game are
changed, some parties come out as losing resources and others as winning
resources compared to the ex ante distribution. This is why, in organizations
as in any political community, regulatory changes need the support of
members with both power and legitimacy to push for these changes. Specific
members, those with multiple and loosely connected forms of status, are the
key in such changes, because they can use such dependencies and legitimacy
in the regulatory process.
Structural Sociology, Social Exchange and Barter
Values count for economic actors, not simply through moral virtue but through
politicized negotiation of the terms of exchanges. This means that conventions
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(a term that could easily Ð perhaps too easily Ð be used by sociologists as a
synonym for rules) are connected to structures not only through the concepts of
precarious value and multi-status oligarchs, but also through other underlying
concepts. It is true that SelznickÕs approach is indispensable, in our view, to any
structural understanding of social life and exchanges. However, it does not
encompass the whole of the relationships between structure and conventions.
Analytically speaking, upstream of SelznickÕs approach, an underlying theory
of strategic rationality is available as a bridge. In effect, since actors politicize
their exchanges by using their resource dependencies and identity criteria, rules
and conventions are linked to relational structures in several ways.
Recall that social niches are subsets of actors that are able to share identity
criteria, to exchange multiple resources without general equivalence and to
suspend short term opportunism. This reminds us that the theory of action on
which structural sociologists rely is necessarily an interactionist theory of social
exchange, to be distinguished from market exchange. Social life can be identi-
fied with a set of particularistic exchange systems handling multiple resources
between heterogeneous actors, while allowing social mechanisms that are
necessary for their reproduction. The basic notions here are those of multiplex-
ity and barter, which allow for exchanges that are different from market
exchanges. The latter relies on general equivalence introduced by accounting
and monetary measures which make it possible to evaluate and compare goods.
It pretends to ignore the heterogeneity of actors involved in the exchange in
order to reach a form of universalism that does not need social structures. But
for structural sociology, the notions of multiplexity and barter are precisely the
notions that bring a symbolic dimension into social exchanges (and thus the
notions of identity, authority and hierarchy of allegiances).
This theory of action was recently developed in different directions: first,
as an interactionist theory of ÔcoorientationÕ through Ôappropriateness judg-
mentsÕ that are necessary for members of any collective to define the situation
and to politicize allocation of resources; second, as a theory of the manage-
ment of multiplex resources explaining the possibility of ÔgenericÕ social
mechanisms identified above, such as bounded solidarity, control and regula-
tion. This, in our view, is equivalent to saying that conventions (understood
both in LewisÕs narrow sense and in FavereauÕs more general sense) are
needed as follows in structural economic sociology.
First, norms and rules are necessary to structuralist understanding of social
life because they are needed for cognitive coorientation: there is no definition of
the situation without legitimate authority and without deference towards
members who can wield authority arguments in the process of (re)defining the
situation. Conventions are minimally needed as signals of symbolic recognition
of membership and of authority. Second, norms are also needed for social
exchange and the constitution of social niches and the bounded solidarity that
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characterizes them. In effect, norms help create relationships (that are then
necessary for generic social mechanisms). Others are often selected as exchange
partners or third parties so as to conform to the rules, or because they are thought
to be able to share oneÕs values, the same rules of the game. For example,
convergent social expectations (such as normative expectations expressed by
colleagues) reduce individual costs of social control by triggering lateral control
interventions at the triadic level (Lazega, 2000; Lazega and Lebeaux, 1995;
Lazega and Krackhardt, 2000); they also create the role of multi-target lever. The
dynamics of structure are intextricably intertwined with the normative realm.
Third, without norms, there is no connection between the micro and the macro
levels of analysis. For example, indirect and postponed reciprocity, also identi-
fied here as generalized exchange or bounded solidarity, is a meso-level social
mechanism that is not conceivable outside a social niche and without common
normative ground. Similarly, without norms, there can be no management of
status competition since, in any society, social values define acceptable forms of
status (in)consistency. To come back to the example of control as a social mech-
anism, costs of control of others increase dramatically when norms concerning
avoidance of conflict escalation are weak, because the second-order free-rider
problem (that is, Ôwho will monitor and sanction deviant behaviour?Õ) becomes
unmanageable. Finally, norms are also necessary for driving endogenous
change: procedural rules organize constitutional or regulatory deliberations in
any group: learning of new behaviour by the collective.
In turn, relational structures are necessary not only for efficient formulation
and interpretation of rules and conventions (which otherwise would be
endless), but also for change and evolution of rules. Recall that, since any such
change means broken promises, it positions members who were called Ômulti-
status oligarchsÕ favourably to redefine priorities between precarious values
and derived policy options. Regulatory changes, and indeed social change in
general, need the leadership and support of members with several inconsistent
forms of status. Thus, in our view, conventions and structures are inextricably
related in broadly conceived structuralist approaches to social and economic
life.
HOW ARE CONVENTIONS AND STRUCTURES 
RELATED IN THE CONVENTIONALIST BROADENING
OF THE INDIVIDUALIST RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
IN ECONOMICS?
Our broadly conceived institutional approach to economic life can be summa-
rized by five characteristics, which are very close to the five characterics
defining the structural approach to social life, mutatis mutandis.5
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The first is that the rational individuals exhibited by economic theorizing are
interested not only in personal direct sources of satisfaction but also in collec-
tive indirect ones. More precisely, the arguments of the utility function, beside
consumption and leisure, should include an evaluation of the ÔqualityÕ of the
collective entities to which the individual belongs: it is a trivial fact of
economic life that individuals had rather work in firms reputed for their equity,
invest in a democratic peaceful society, make business with an administration
not infested with corruption, and so on. Of course the quality of the collective
entities just mentioned will eventually exert a first-order impact upon the
private arguments of the utility function but the point is that the evaluation of
the collective entity cannot be reduced to its material consequences, except for
highly peculiar periods (crisis probably). It could be shown that qualifiying the
collective entity is a very convenient shorthand for an economic agent who has
to fill in the blanks of incomplete contracting due to radical uncertainty in an
interactive context. Such a practice, typical of procedural rationality and obvi-
ously of high evolutionary efficiency, should be backed by a new theory of
identity for homo economicus, like the theory of Ôsocial identityÕ (Turner, 1987;
Haslam, 2001). Ultimately, that first characteristic, the most basic one, is the
economic application of the Aristotelian postulate: man is a political animal.
The second characteristic specifies conventionalist economics within the
non standard components of economic theory making use of bounded ratio-
nality. Homo economicus has neither the cognitive abilities nor the necessary
information to remain the relentless optimizer modelled by mainstream
economics. But if he is less rational, he is also more intelligent: one aspect of
his intelligence regained consists in the appearance of an interpretive form of
rationality, in excess of its computational form, which is the only one available
to the mainstream homo economicus. The interpretive ability of the new homo
economicus comes from necessity: questions of rationality could no longer be
dealt with apart from questions of coordination, as is supposed in the distinct
axiomatics of decision theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, Savage,
1954) and of general equilibrium theory (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). The
semantic capacities of individual agents are required even in isolation, for
instance when the choice problem implies a quality judgment (usually multi-
criteria) Ð but their use must be generalized, when dealing with others. It is
manifest in contexts of incomplete contracting, since agents have to make a
mental representation about the type of collective entity associated with a
satisfactory functioning of contractual exchanges. That representation is
endowed with all the formal properties usually attributed to conventions,
according to their most common meaning: tacitness, unknown source, absence
of authorized sanctions, and so on.
The conversion to cognitive realism at both levels, psychological and soci-
ological, has already laid several stepstones, on the way to building a bridge
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from individual to collective planes. The third characteristic brings to the fore
the theme of coordination by means of rules, as a generalization of coordina-
tion by market prices, privileged by mainstream economics, since . . . Adam
Smith. For conventionalist economics, it is simply impossible to speak about
economy without speaking about organizations, and to speak about organiza-
tions without speaking about rules Ð and we have just seen that it is impossi-
ble to speak about (interpretation of) rules without speaking about
conventions. The whole field of organizational structures and mechanisms is
on the research agenda of conventionalist economics. What has already been
seriously investigated is the role of objects (so strangely neglected in the
analysis of coordination) and also the authority relationship through the labour
contract.
In order to study those subjects, the economics of conventions Ð and this
will be the fourth characteristic of a broadly conceived institutional approach
to economic life Ð makes use of some specific tools (beside the traditional ones
used by economists). First, attention is directed towards the verbal arguments
produced by the agents themselves, in case of conflict, to justify their atti-
tude and the situations where all the agents are led to agree about the relative
strength of their respective arguments (the interested reader is invited to refer
to Boltanski and Thvenot, 1991, while keeping in mind the following
methodological principle: coordination of economic behaviours must include,
in our view of homo economicus, coordination of judgments about economic
behaviours); second, research is centred on the rules followed by economic
agents, but the rules should be understandable by the agents themselves (as in
participant observation recommended by Piore, 1974), which means that the
researcher tries to be faithful to the variety of the systems of interpretation, in
which economic agents are trained, from their childhood. It comes as no
surprise that one of the favourite tool of the conventionalist approach is the
typology, notwithstanding the obligation of supplying the unique ÔgrammarÕ
supposed to generate the different types.
Let us conclude with the fifth characteristic, the interdependence between
structures and values in the account of the collective order, especially with
respect to its dynamic aspects. It is less difficult than it may seem at first sight
to study dynamics in an analytic framework stressing rules (and behind rules,
conventions), because rules in a world marked by overwhelming problems of
interpretation should be considered as a heuristics, more than ready-made
solutions. Indeed, our broadly conceived institutional economics, at least at the
level of organizations, reduces the problem of collective change to a problem
of organizational learning, for instance along the lines of the model built by
Argyris and Schn (1978). Although it is a drastic simplification, it nonethe-
less offers deep insights on the hidden contradiction between values and the
dynamics of structures (the contradiction between values and the content of
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structures is well known). Argyris and Schn (1978) differenciate single loop
learning (SLL), which confirms the existing set of rules, and double loop
learning (DLL), which requires a move in the set of governing variables. Now
their most important result is negative: spontaneous DLL is impossible,
because the perspective of leaving the ancient governing variables and enter-
ing an unknown game frightens nearly all the actors, accustomed to the exist-
ing Ôrapports de forceÕ, and triggers multiple Ôdefensive routinesÕ. Only fiat or
extreme crisis can countervene those endogeneous obstacles to DLL (Argyris,
1988). And it will be so as long as the managers of an organization do not
accept the falsifiability of their criteria (in a quasi-Popperian mood) when they
discuss with their subordinates: the worst contradiction lies between values
and changes in structures, if not in the structures themselves.
We can now ask the question which is at the heart of this introduction,
because it is at the heart of this book.
What is the Degree of Proximity between such Broadly Conceived
Institutional Economics and Structural Sociology?
The first point to be noticed is the remarkable similarity (with some significant
differences) between the five characteristics in the two programmes. The first
and the second are almost identical; the third and the fifth one suggest comple-
mentarity rather than identity; difference is logically at its maximum with the
fourth one, devoted to methods. It is obvious that structural sociology is better
equipped to model precise organizational mechanisms, thanks to its practice of
network analysis, whereas institutional economics has a comparative advan-
tage to integrate moral values within coordinating devices, through its ability
to deal with social representations and models of personal identity.
The best insight on the content of what we call the ÔproximityÕ between the
two research programmes may be given by the notion of Ôsocial nichesÕ,6
defined in the (broad) structuralist programme as subsets of actors where
short-term opportunism is suspended (Lazega, 2001). In the (broad) institu-
tionalist dictionary, no item dubbed Ôsocial nicheÕ can be found. Nevertheless,
the conventionalist approach is not ignorant of the phenomenon and it has
much to say on its cognitive/psychological implications at the level of indi-
vidual rationality. The problem of social niche has simply to be correlated with
the problem of incomplete contracting: how is it possible that a rational non-
altruistic individual agent agrees to the terms of an incomplete contract (that
is, a contract unable to specify a rule of conduct in any conceivable state of
nature?). Indeed, this seemingly technical problem is no less than the major
theoretical problem of the foundations of cooperation in a world of non-coop-
erative rationality.
On a strictly inter-individual basis, the solution can be found in rereading
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of the acceptance of an incomplete contract by a non-altruistic agent as a cred-
ible signal of his intention to cooperate. The signal is credible, because it is
costly: the agent becomes the ÔhostageÕ of his partner, in the event of an
unforeseen contingency (Williamson, 1996, ch. 5 ; Favereau, 1997). Note that
the efficiency of the signal is not only preserved but paradoxically, reinforced
by the non-altruism of the agent: it is his long-term interest to suspend his
short-term interest.
The inter-individual face of the solution has to be supplemented by the
collective face, already evoked to introduce the broad acception of conven-
tions: we have proved it is not irrational to suspend short-term opportunism. It
remains to be understood why/when a rational agent decides to do so. Let us
recall the conventionalist solution: the rational agent thinks his contractual
relationship will give him access to a satisfactory Ôcommon worldÕ, together
with all the members of the relevant collective. What objective elements of the
organization under scrutiny enables him to think so? Here is the place where
the structural analysis of Ôsocial nichesÕ becomes an indispensable ally to
allow the conventionalist analysis to overcome its weaknesses and answer its
own most difficult questions. We will have some more to say on this point in
the next paragraph (see also note 4).
The second point to be noticed may be enunciated concisely: the four
reasons listed above to explain why norms/rules/conventions are needed in
structural economic sociology are completely coherent with the spirit of the
conventionalist trend within the institutional economics. The first two reasons
(on the role of rules, respectively, as cognitive guidelines and as normative
foundation of social niches) are most apparent in the conventionalist model of
organizational learning. The last two reasons (on the role of rules, respectively,
in the microÐmacro link and in the process of collective learning) would need
a significant addition of new conventionalist stuff, at the higher level of the
whole society, such as the work of Boltanski and Chiappello (1999) but the
general line of the argument would be the same: the capitalist system cannot
but provoke resistance, objections, criticism, conflicts, struggles . . . Therefore
holders of power find it simultaneously necessary and productive to absorb
part of the criticism by revising work organizations in a way which is more
congruent with some selective set of values. We may summarize the point by
making the remark that the conventionalist approach and the structural
approach meet about the question of legitimacy (even if both rarely use this
vocabulary).
The family resemblance is strong enough to raise the question of its
primary source. Let us risk a conjecture. The central issue in social science is
the connexion between representations and structures. The new (ÔbroadÕ)
structural sociology proceeds from the discovery that, in a human world, struc-
tures are neither completely nor correctly analysed without the representations
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about the structures, whereas, in a social world, the new (ÔconventionalistÕ)
institutional economics proceeds from the discovery that representations are
neither completely nor correctly analysed without the context of their
surrounding structures: indeed, in a perfecly homogeneous world, mental
representations are either devoid of any analytical interest or overcrowded
with artificial problems and theoretical artefacts (such as common knowledge,
in game theory). A corollary of this conjecture is that cooperation between
(ÔbroadÕ) structural sociology and (ÔconventionalistÕ) institutional economics
will be most productive in the field of socioeconomic change: it is highly plau-
sible that true dynamics come from interplay between (change in) representa-
tions and (change in) structures.7
To end this section on a more cautious note, Ôfamily resemblanceÕ is not
synonymous with perfect likeness. Structural sociology and institutional
economics, even broadly conceived, are not two labels for the same merchan-
dise. The difference is still there: the first approach starts from the social
exchange (beautifully re-evaluating barter) and shows the market exchange as
a very special case; the second approach is only concerned with market
exchange but has found it is mistakenly modelled, when it is done with the
sole help of the traditional tools of mainstream economics (whose hard core is
rational choice theory).8 Good economics has now to borrow some good soci-
ology to do its own job. That means that economics needs an exteriority; and
therefore sociology too.
This book provides mainly theoretical contributions that help in the effort
to mind and fill the gap between the two disciplines. To frame this dialogue
between economists and sociologists, the texts offered here are considered to
be either didactic in the sense that they lead to the necessity of such a
combined research programme, or exploratory in the sense that they deal in
one way or another with this complementarity.
A DIDACTIC PART
The first series of chapters provide the current landscape of theories that bring
together sociological and economic approaches, while not yet combining the
notions of convention and structure in economics and sociology of markets
and organizations.
Typical of an approach that builds on structural insights and pushes towards
a general theory of action without referring to conventions is the theory of
social capital by Henk Flap. In the first chapter, he presents the elusive link
between rational choice approaches and structures as defined by networks
analysts. SomeoneÕs social relations can be interpreted as his social capital
since they are instrumental for goal attainment. Rational actors invest and
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disinvest in relationships depending on the present value of future help. Their
social capital has four dimensions: the number of persons prepared to help, the
strength of the relationships, the resources to which these relationships give
access, and the degree to which these others have alternatives to dealing with
ego. This key idea is meant to explain the effects of social networks as well as
the emergence of networks. Structural effects are especially identified with
organizational conditions influencing the returns on social capital. This
productionÐinvestment argument is supported by findings in labour market
research and research on primary relations. Major themes within the research
programme are the constraints of places (ÔfociÕ) and numbers (Ôthe supply
sideÕ) as well as technological and organizational conditioning of returns of
social capital (for example, weak ties are a liability in communist societies, so
people have smaller networks with a small, dense niche of strong ties to the
few whom they trust). Recent developments within the programme concern
the goal specificity of social capital as well as the social capital of corporate
actors.
Contrary to ColemanÕs approach (1990), rules are ruled out here as a form
of social capital because the latter concept would then, it is argued, lose its
specificity. This theory aims at closing a theory gap in network research and
explaining why the neostructuralist claim of pure structural effects is wrong.
It does so by compounding all the resources that circulate under the same
abstract category of social capital. Resources brought by social capital are left
deliberately general and vague; they are any form of help. It is unclear
however how norms would influence the value of social capital. Members are
instrumentally rational in their investments and disinvestments in ties. There
is little collective action in this approach. There are no formal structures and
rules in this chapterÕs reasoning on social capital. Henk Flap starts with ratio-
nal choice and networks, not with production and collective action.
Measurements of social capital are looking for a stable unit which might be a
dyadic tie, although a tie associated with many conditions. This raises the issue
of the existence of networks that do not lean on institutional and organizational
structures, without specific collective goals, from which actors are able to
extract resources Ôin generalÕ.
Two schools in economics that bring conventions into their thinking are
then represented and discussed. First, Ôconomie des conventionsÕ is charac-
terized by its importing of elements from the sociology of organizations into
economics.
Building on the understanding of convention described above, Franois
Eymard-Duvernay describes the conventionalist approach to organizations
(who find themselves at the intersection of various markets), including a state-
ment about pluralities of rules and of rationalities. In his view, coordination is
not only in the calculations of rational actors, it is based on judgments and
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conventions about quality. He observes that there is a wide variety of enter-
prises within a single sector. The strength of the market theory is that it fits all
these activities into the same framework of calculation. But that is also its
weakness. Organizations as such have an important and underestimated role in
coordinating various markets.9 Recognition of the coordination role played by
firms involves an investigation of their variety, which corresponds to a variety
of forms of coordination, and the development of a comparative approach.
Eymard-Duvernay presents a theoretical and empirical comparative approach
of Ôcorporate modelsÕ. Each model corresponds to a coherent conception of
what the quality of a product and of work is (quality convention). There is no
single best way of evaluating quality, and this uncertainty complicates coordi-
nation within activities. The concept of convention orients the analysis of
institutions in a particular direction. It indicates that there is a plurality of
conventions and that the problem is choosing between different possible
conventions. He presents examples of this kind of arbitration by managers:
between what he calls complete contract and close ties; between market and
network. He also explores the question of the dynamics of conventions.
In other words, Eymard-Duvernay joins sociologists who assert that actors
are not just parts of structures. They act on them in a plurality of ways. His is
a position that is close to negotiated order theory (Strauss, 1978). Is the rela-
tionship with structures absent from his work, as is often the case with this
latter theory? Identifying an action regime on which the firm operates is vital
for the firm. Although structures may be assumed in his approach, there is no
description of interdependencies of actors in their interpretation work. What
Eymard-Duvernay is interested in is the means that actors use to renegotiate
an order, even if it is not predictable through their interactions. Conventions
are the means that guide interpretation in the situation. This is where learning
and apprenticeship are brought in. Contract incompleteness leads to learning
and interpretation is problematic. This approach offers leads for understanding
the relationship between conventions and structures in a very crude way: for
example, a domestic action regime is only compatible with small units includ-
ing only a few actors. But bringing out resource interdependencies among
different types of actors in a multilateral situation is not the main focus. Thus,
in several ways, the question of this book challenges Eymard-DuvernayÕs
approach to enlarge what it means by resources10 and to take into account such
differences as vertical versus horizontal coordination.
Economics of Conventions is not alone in the study of rules in economics.
The second school, new institutional economics, emphasizes the role played
by institutions considered as patterns of interactions between actors, in the
sense of rules that constrain their behaviour. In his contribution, Christian
Bessy specifies the differences between the above-mentioned and NorthÕs
(1990) definition of rules. He looks at the convergence between New
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Institutional Economics (NIE) and the Economics of Conventions (EC).
Certain developments in NIE over the past few years have created areas of
overlap with the EC on the question of the institutional anchorage of economic
exchange and the organization. Since the work of Williamson (if not of
Coase), the comparison between different coordination mechanisms or orga-
nizational forms, depending on the characteristics of the institutional environ-
ment, and, more analytically, the hypothesis of ÔboundedÕ rationality, have
constituted research perspectives common to both approaches. Certain devel-
opments in NIE over the past few years have created areas of overlap with the
French EC school of thinking on the question of the institutional embedded-
ness of economic exchange and its type of organization. BessyÕs chapter iden-
tifies these similarities (beyond the divergences), taken from the most recent
work of North on cognitive processes, for NIE, and certain representatives of
EC. In the first part he considers the plurality of institutions, with a particular
focus on the problems of analytical coherence facing both approaches. In the
second part he analyses more precisely the interdependence between cognitive
processes and institutions. Both parts highlight problems of empirical investi-
gation and validation of analyses. It is worth keeping in mind that, in his work
on institutional change, NorthÕs interest in the part played by ÔinformalÕ insti-
tutions (conventions, behavioural norms and so on) caused him to move
further away from neoclassical economics. More recently, the emphasis on the
articulation between cognitive processes and institutions (Knight and North,
1997) has brought him even closer to the research programme of the EC.
Bessy notes that observation constraints characterizing a research programme
common to both approaches, as defined here with reference to ties between
cognition and institutions, are very costly, especially as validation constraints
based on statistical proof.11 But in terms of combining instrumental and axio-
logical rationalities, NIE and EC face the same challenges.
In our view, two more approaches attempt to bring together insights from
economics and sociology. The first is transaction cost economics (TCE), the
second organizational ecology (OE). In the first, a protostructural approach to
markets and organizations is offered that stops short of actually looking into
how they operate. The second eliminates agency altogether. Before moving to
more limited, but deeper, attempts, these approaches are also presented.
Chabaud and Saussier present a summary of TCE basics in which the insti-
tutional environment is assumed. TCE understand organizations as coordina-
tion devices that are not reducible to the price mechanism. Their coordination
of collective action is based on contracts dealing with moral hazard and oppor-
tunistic behaviour. But contracts and property rights are not sufficient to coor-
dinate; they are incomplete and they fail, among other things because of asset
specificities involved, for example when these assets are intangible and
personal. They are difficult to contractualize and to enforce, so TCE studies
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governance structures built to deal with failing contracts. An institutional envi-
ronment structures transactions and production by favouring specific contrac-
tual arrangements plus collective governance devices, incentive intensity,
modalities of control and modalities of adaptation. This is where TCE agrees
in principle to bring in a form of social discipline, thus a more structural
approach. The authors are more transaction cost economists, expanding on
WilliamsonÕs perspective via Claude MnardÕs (1997, 2000) approach. In their
chapter they illustrate the weaknesses and recent improvements of the theory,
focusing more especially on the analysis of inter-firm agreements and intra-
firm organization. In TCE, the notion of governance structure implies that
actors choose their constraints the mechanisms that will safeguard their
contracts, and make their mutual commitments credible. PartnersÕ characteris-
tics, for example their level of asset specificity, may or may not encourage the
creation of an economic tie. This insight, however, is not pushed towards its
true structural implications, that is, a true understanding of resource interde-
pendencies among actors. Governance structures are understood as formal
devices that help actors reach such credible commitments to each other and
overcome their respective opportunism. Individuals can compute what kind of
governance structure is more adapted to the transaction. Another aspect is that,
when the specificity of assets and therefore interdependence between agents
increase, this introduces a dynamic dimension. This becomes a way to endog-
enize the assets. And the dynamic aspect is more difficult to integrate with
standard tools.
Specifying the relationship between TCE and structural analysis, on the one
hand, and Ôconomie des conventionsÕ, on the other, is important here. First, in
many ways, Chabaud and Saussier are structuralists, but the structures that they
look at remain formal and legal. In effect, for Williamson, there is no need for
conventions. Actors only calculate. They ask: what is the governance structure
that minimizes transaction costs? There is nothing left to interpret. Structures
of governance are legal constraints: market, hierarchy, hybrid. One of these
governance structures, hierarchy, has a great variety. But resource interdepen-
dencies do not lead to new structures in WilliamsonÕs reasoning, although noth-
ing serious prevents this theory from adding them. Second, the distinction
between calculation and interpretation mentioned above is practical for differ-
entiating TCE and EC, with NorthÕs NIE standing in between. For TCE, all can
be boiled down to calculation (transaction costs, even metaphorically speak-
ing). NIE stands in between because it considers part of the institutional envi-
ronment as informal. Institution is not simply a set of vague and remote
constraints (TCE), but a model of interaction between agents (EC and NIE).
Thus the institution is the structure, but not in the sense of a pattern of resource
interdependencies. Hierarchies of rules are added to such structural constraints
(with informal rules being the most inert, and thus difficult to change).
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Finally, organization ecology also represents an attempt to bring together
economics and sociology. It is based on the assumption that agency also may
have limits. David Barron looks at the way OE helps in the definition of
opportunities and constraints for organizations, then at the combination of
legitimacy and density in OE, and at the articulation of structural analysis and
OE. Reviews of organizational ecology usually start by making reference to
Hannan and FreemanÕs (1977) article, which was the foundation for the large
body of research that has developed over the past twenty years or so. The
central question posed by Hannan and Freeman was ÔWhy are there so many
kinds of organizations?Õ Although little, if any, empirical research has sought
to answer this question directly, ecologists are always concerned with explain-
ing how Ôsocial economic, and political conditions affect the relative abun-
dance and diversity of organizations and attempt to account for their changing
composition over timeÕ (Baum, 1996, p. 77). To this end, most empirical
research in this tradition has concentrated on explaining the rates at which new
organizations are founded and/or the rate at which existing organizations
disband, a sub-branch of organizational ecology that is sometimes called or
organizational demography. The other main sub-branch of the field has been
concerned with changes in individual organizations. This sub-branch has
developed out of the work of another American sociologist, Miller McPherson
(1983). Recently, a few scholars have been attempting to combine some of the
features of these two sub-branches of ecological research. The encapsulation
of the concerns of ecological researchers quoted above summarizes some of
the key characteristics of ecological research. First, it is concerned with the
effect of the environment on organizations. In this sense, it is an example of
what Scott (1991) calls an open systems theory. Second, it seeks to explain
characteristics of collections of organizations: populations.
After presenting this ecological and dynamic approach to organizational
survival, David Barron tries to combine concepts that ring a bell mainly with
structural approaches (not much with conventionalist ones). The concepts are
those of niches, legitimacy and organizations. Reasoning here begins with
organizations in need of resources, and moves to the demographics of organi-
zational forms (small/large, specialized/generalists), foundings, growth rates
and mortality, by thinking in terms of density, various forms of legitimacy and
competition. Here Barron reaches more structural forms of reasoning when
discussing the structuring of organizational populations, particularly with the
concept of niche, niche width and niche overlap. He compares his definition
with what Harrison White (1981a) and others call a niche in network terms.
Specifically, he explores four areas where ecological and structural theories
have been drawn together: (a) the use of network concepts and data to define
and identify population niches (and hence organizational forms) (Burt, 1991;
Burt and Talmud, 1993); (b) the diffusion of organizational forms via social
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networks (Barron, 1998); (c) the role played by networks in organizational
dynamics (McPherson and RangerMoore, 1991); (d) technology networks and
organizational niches (Podolny et al., 1996).
With OE, we changed the level of analysis. What organization ecologists
want to explain is organizational diversity, what differentiates firms, not
markets. Their research is about the dynamics within a market. We are look-
ing at and comparing populations of organizations. Organization ecologists
think of themselves as different from contingency theories in that they do not
study individual organizations: this is how they want to be a bridge between
economics and sociology. Compared to approaches which look at the emer-
gence or social construction of markets and their boundaries, this theory takes
markets as a given. It is much more about organizational survival in given
markets than about markets themselves. The main thrust of the theory has been
to understand, given a grouping of organizations that evolves over time in a
complex world made of markets, governments and so on, what are the chances
of survival for various categories of organizations. OE thus introduces a key
dependent variable for many processes examined above, but does not
contribute to explaining its results from an actor-oriented perspective, be it
instrumental or axiological. One might think that organization sociologists
should cut across standard economistsÕ technologically driven definition of
market instead of assuming it.
In their chapter, Emmanuel Lazega and Lise Mounier summarize the
contribution of early structural analyses of markets and organizations. They
then look at new structural approaches that combine structural analyses with
richer behavioural assumptions. This leads to an understanding of resource
interdependencies as a basis for the emergence of social mechanisms such as
bounded solidarity (based on generalized exchange) and control, with their
influence on membersÕ returns on investments (in effort, in resources and in
relations). The notion of multiplexity and the study of barter of different types
of resources are used to think of organizations or even whole industries
(Granovetter, 1994) as structured and constraining exchange systems. In
general, it is recognized that networks help members get access to the
resources they need; but they are a sort of jungle. Collective actors need rules
and conventions to distribute and allocate those resources in ways less depen-
dent on personal ties. Networks are made of pairwise relations that are put
together by actors who commit themselves to each other. They are not only
concatenations or pairwise ties in the eye of the observer. In order to look at
the way collective actors solve problems of coordination, one has to look not
only at the exchanges that they reflect, but also at the ways in which their
members manage and politicize these exchanges. For this, it is important to
bring in a whole series of concepts (rules, values and fairness judgments) that
the notion of convention encompasses. This distinction between an old and a
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new structural approach to markets and organizations is meant to illustrate the
coming together of perspectives combining instrumental and axiological
forms of rationality (Ferrand and Shijders, 1997). The next section presents
contributions that come closer to that goal.
THE EXPLORATORY PART: ATTEMPTS TO COMBINE
CONVENTIONS AND STRUCTURES
Explicit attempts to combine conventionalist and structural approaches to
opportunity and constraint first include Alain DegenneÕs theory (Chapter 7) of
how economic relationships are regulated ; Favereau, Biencourt and Eymard-
Duvernay address the issue of structure and interdependencies in their criti-
cism of Harrison WhiteÕs model. Emmanuel Lazega and Lise Mounier look at
the way structural characteristics of members constrain the process of
(re)defining formal and informal rules. Siegwart Lindenberg attempts to
combine structural and normative approaches in a theory of solidarity. In order
for a link to exist between the two disciplines, there is a need for a theory of
individual action and a contextualization. Do we find them in all the texts that
claim to combine them? Recall that structure is defined as regularities in
multiple resource interdependencies among actors in place; interdependencies
are always multiplex (defined for several resources) and multilateral.
Conventions are defined as rules or quasi-rules that help in the coordination
with others through consent or quasi-consent.
Combining conventions and structures can be done by beginning to look at
the relationship between labour markets and organizations. For example,
labour market studies show that, with the diversification of goods, firms
cannot plan their work well ahead of time, so there is a flexible labour contract
and a specific labour market for a specific good production. Regardless of this,
the process of hiring is a kind of blindspot in standard economic theory, which
does not need any particular theory of recruitment: every worker has his/her
own Ômarginal productivityÕ and the only problem, for the recruiting firm, is
to compare it with a wage level. Indeed, in such a world, there is only a market
for labour. Organization appears (and recruitment becomes a practical and a
theoretical issue) as soon as this Ômarginal productivityÕ becomes unclear. In
this context, Alain Degenne offers a view of labour markets that looks at types
of trajectories of persons at entry level. He combines the perspective of
employers with that of employees (or prospective employees) to capture the
ÔmatchÕ between them. He shows that we need detailed analysis of the
employerÐemployee relationship, its forms of regulation, its variety, its multi-
plexity, in order to understand what is a labour market. New trends in the
hiring of youth and substantial recent research interest in this population both
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indicate that these new hiring policies are now being applied to other cate-
gories of job seekers. Subsidized jobs, temping and their forms of precarious
employment are not incompatible with the establishment of stable
employerÐemployee relationships. Precarious employment is a complex
phenomenon that cannot be boiled down to a by-product of economic reces-
sions. There is no evidence that a sustained return to high growth will sweep
away established behaviour patterns, especially when they are the result of a
process of repositioning a company in its market.
In DegenneÕs broad structural approach, labour markets have two intercon-
nected dimensions: wages and relations between partners; what is being nego-
tiated is rarely wages, it is rather the relationship. He has a typology of forms
of trust between employer and employee and his language is sometimes close
to that of transaction costs economics (costs of maintaining the relationship
and so on). He writes about a ÔmatchÕ, not really about a ÔmarketÕ. He insists
on the diversity of contracts. In his typology of contracts, some relations are
long term (as opposed to spot transactions). This burgeoning structural
approach to labour markets focuses on the multiplex employerÐemployee tie
and two of its dimensions. Such ties are the building blocks of wider struc-
tures; constraints (and macroeconomic consequences for unemployment)
could therefore be derived from this exploratory approach. One limitation,
however, is that it is less ÔorganizationalÕ than it could be from its own point
of view, mainly owing to the lack of proper data. One can observe labour
markets and behaviour in them (for example, testing hypotheses on the rela-
tionship between wages and commitment, since the latter are also meant to
reduce opportunism), but this is rarely done. So there is still a whole part of
reality missing from this presentation, mainly because the right datasets are
not available (that is, there is the problem of combining employersÕ and
employeesÕ perspectives in the same dataset). As long as we do not have data
about the circulation of personnel between firms (which need personnel but do
not have time to train them and cannot afford to give them long term
contracts), we do not evaluate theories about an organizational approach to the
labour market.
Nevertheless, DegenneÕs view opens up an avenue for combining rules and
resources. The circulation of the resource that the employer wants most
(workerÕs goodwill) needs a context of trust that they must build together in
very different ways that are not yet spelled out. Specific combinations of ways
characterize entire segments of the labour market. The scientific goal here
being to redefine the structure of the labour market, this is work in progress
that does not yet reach that stage. It is a form of neo-institutionalist reasoning,
or perhaps a transaction costs reasoning applied to (mainly informal) labour
markets Ð but without calculation of transaction costs. From the perspective of
this book, it is important to see that Degenne does include conventions in his
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model since his analysis rests on an agreement between employers and
employees, if not on common representations, that is, on a basic ingredient of
the idea of convention. He is looking for a structure that would emerge from
the trajectories of actors involved in these different types of conventions in the
employment relationships. As for Henk FlapÕs approach, the main (and only)
resource here is the otherÕs goodwill.
Harrison WhiteÕs (1981b, 2001) model of markets is another theory show-
ing the complementarity of economic and sociological approaches allowing
for combination of conventions and structures. In 1981, Harrison White
extended and simplified his theory of relational structures in order to devise an
entirely new model of markets for manufactured goods, founded on the vari-
ance of business firm choices in a quality/price space. He looks at product
markets through the issue of the quality of goods. Differences in organiza-
tional structures in firms are connected to the nature of the goods produced and
to the quality of these goods. The combination of the two approaches in this
type of market is offered in the juxtaposition of goods markets and interorga-
nizational structures. In this perspective, Olivier Favereau, Franois Eymard-
Duvernay and Olivier Biencourt present their reading of the W(y) model with
its basic components (networks of producers watching each other, uncertain-
ties and judgments about the quality of goods, the subsequent creation of
niches, and the typology of sustainable markets). They show that WhiteÕs
typology of viable markets could be connected with the existence of quality
conventions, on which consumers and producers must agree, if competition is
to produce some kind of order. In other words, they combine this model in
broad strokes with types of firms, quality conventions and contexts of
exchange (merchant, industrial and domestic). Finally, they argue that this
connection should be considered an opportunity for improvement of both
theories: theory of relational structures and theory of conventions.
The connection between quality conventions and W(y) deserves more
scrutiny so as to identify their commonalities. The market schedule W(y)
supposes a dispersion of firms on a quality array on which the firm must place
itself. This approach is thus close to conventions because, in WhiteÕs model, a
specular phenomenon produces an order, through a mixture of calculation and
interpretation. An underlying structure of interdependencies is assumed
behind every quality convention, but, as in Alain DegenneÕs approach, it is not
necessarily explicitly described and conceptualized. The main resource here is
an actorÕs aptitude to produce in a way slightly different from that of others,
that is, in a way that makes him or her different.
Olivier Biencourt and Daniel Urrutiaguer offer two case studies to illustrate
this approach. For them, market profiles help to formalize producer and
customer networksÕ logics. In the road transport case, economic deregulation
led to a resistance to commercial contracts. Either relationships between
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hauliers and customers are constructed on the basis of personal trust, as in a
ÔparadoxÕ market, or there is a pressure on industrial attestation, as in a
ÔcrowdedÕ profile. WhiteÕs typology shows the way to classify organization
performances by the comparison of consumersÕ tastes and producersÕ costs
with changes in volume and quality of products. The quantitative valuation
method of theatrical institutions which are interpreted as a market organized
by the directorÐprogramme planner has proved adequately operational in this
way. For empirical studies the main limit of WhiteÕs model is its vertical
differentiation of products. So quality is assessed by consensus while in the
quality order of theatre judgments exhibit the opposition between media
renown embodied by drama critics and institutional attestation of programme
planners. Intermediaries are ignored while playing a key part in the networks
formation for theatre and road haulage.
Another attempt to look at the relationship between conventions and struc-
tures can be credited to Ôframing theoryÕ of solidarity. In his chapter, Siegwart
Lindenberg theorizes the coming together of economics and sociology since
the 1960s; he aims to answer three questions left open by previous theories of
solidarity (including rational choice theories of solidarity and social capital).
What kind of behaviour constitutes solidarities? Under what conditions is soli-
darity supposed to arise and why? What makes solidarity precarious and how
is this precariousness resolved? Part of the chapter deals with the inadequacy
of other theories. After criticizing DurkheimÕs approach, Lindenberg presents
his version of a rational choice approach to solidarity, especially by asserting
hypotheses about how actors sustain a farsighted rationality that puts restraints
on maximizing behaviour. Lindenberg thus provides new microfoundations
for solidarity. His theory is that framing, a cognitive process that adjusts situ-
ationally the marginal utility of goods, is the crucial phenomenon underlying
solidarity and sharing groups. Frames and rules are thus very strongly inter-
dependent.
He then addresses the issue of how sharing groups maintain frame stability,
especially through relational signalling. This theory allows him to differentiate
weak and strong solidarity in society at large. LindenbergÕs approach is easily
connected to convention theory (through relational signalling that is based on
language and metacommunication). But there is more difficulty in connecting
this approach with a structural perspective, because LindenbergÕs approach
assumes that just making small signals is enough to restore cooperation. It is a
very strongly situational theory that emphasizes the precariousness of coopera-
tive endeavours; perhaps structures come in via the stabilization of the frames
as an organizational process, and the creation of a long term rationality also as
an organizational process. Nevertheless, structural constraints and power rela-
tionships that express them are simplified to such an extent that many social
processes characterizing collective action in organizations or coordination in
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markets may not be easily derived from this original combination of actorÕs
instrumental and axiological rationalities accounting for solidarity.
The variety of approaches to economic action described above leads to
many possible syntheses. In our view, it is worth narrowing this set of possi-
ble syntheses down to a comparison between a broadly conceived structural
approach and a broadly conceived Ôconomie des conventionsÕ. This compar-
ison is provided next.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, contributions to this book promote research programmes that
are important for attempts to combine conventions and structures, axiological
or value-oriented and instrumental rationalities. Economics of conventions
assumes that members think about their economic activity, and that econom-
ics should take such representations and reflexivity into account. This approch
is entirely compatible with a Weberian sociological perspective in which
actorsÕ interpretive work helps them sort out their interests. Economic sociol-
ogy considers the intertwining of instrumentally and normatively rational
actions in equally close ways. Norms and values count for economic actors,
not simply through moral virtue but often through politicized social exchange
and derived relational structures.
If bringing together the two perspectives is somewhat suprising and innov-
ative, it is because structural sociology used to start from a holistic, anti-indi-
vidualistic approach, while institutional economics in terms of conventions
proceeded from an individualist methodology, although of a type admitting
collective objects (see Dupuy et al., 1989, introduction). For heterodox econ-
omists, this rapprochement helps in combining the individualistic tradition of
economics with themes such as relational structures, inequalities and power, in
order to analyse more accurately the content and consequences of agentsÕ deci-
sions, whether individual or collective, or both. For structural sociologists, it
is an opportunity to think about ways to combine analyses of multiplex social
exchanges and that of market exchanges when accounting for individual and
collective actions.
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the possible use of even closer ties between
conventions and structures for a research programme that would be useful to
both economists and sociologists. Such closer ties emerge in the enmeshed
dynamics of conventions and structures. For sociologists, efforts to reshape
oneÕs opportunity structure take the form of redefinition of rules (either for the
management of exchanges or for the selection of exchange partners). This is
consistent with basic assumptions of the French school of economics of
conventions (Dupuy et al., 1989; Favereau, 1997, 2001b; Salais and Storper,
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1993). As already mentioned members interpret their economic activity, and
that economics should take such representations and reflexivity into account
in order to theorize coordination in production. Similarly in the Weberian
tradition, economic sociology wants to show the intertwining of instrumen-
tally rational actions and normatively rational actions. Norms and values count
for economic actors, through the negotiation of the terms of exchanges and
selection of exchange partners.
Conventions thus include rules to which members refer to conduct produc-
tion-related exchanges. With regard to economic behaviour, particularly
barter, conforming to customary rules is helpful in that it makes exchanges
predictable in a context in which pure costÐbenefit calculation is suspended,
given the conditions under which barter is possible. As seen above, identifica-
tion with others in the niche is used to understand how members deal with
multiplex ties and barter. With identification come attached a series of rules
concerning the management of multiplex resources.12 Others are often chosen
as exchange partners, bystanders or third parties so as to confirm the rules. The
latter thus reach a certain stability that helps economic actors coordinate
production and distribution. This definition has strong normative extensions:
it helps identify what to expect legitimately in terms of commitments and soli-
darity in exchanges of resources. Institutionalized definitions of the situations
always conflict with less institutionalized ones, but they nevertheless often
overlap sufficiently to help in handling exchanges of multiple resources.
This normative realm includes conventions, understood either as informal
rules or as interpretive keys to formal rules that help in the coordination with
others through consent (agreement) or quasi-consent. For the French represen-
tatives of Ôconomie des conventionsÕ, convention refers to many more aspects
of social and economic life than rules, although the latter are included in the
former. Conventions are often agreements about how one should coordinate
with others, but grounded on interpretation as much as on calculation. But to
the extent that they are rules, they do not determine behaviour mechanically
because they have to be interpreted and applied. They are sometimes resources,
sometimes constraints, depending on the situation and on where the individual
is in the structure. This is why actors have to have an idea of the social collec-
tive associated with the correct functioning of these rules, that is, in which they
want to coordinate with others (see Favereau, Biencourt and Eymard-
DuvernayÕs chapter below). Underneath every kind of rule, there is a conven-
tional representation of the collective. We referred to one such collective as a
social niche. Thus, if conventions can be construed as a set of rules of the game
based on precarious values in organizations, Ôconomie des conventionsÕ can be
easily connected with a structural approach, even more easily if actors are not
allowed to get rid of the problem of conflicts of interpretation of the rules. Here,
structure is defined by roles and status (or multiple forms of status) as a
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concentration of various types of resources in oligarchs, that is, notables multi-
plying elective charges to ÔreadÕ social norms have a real regulatory power as
intermediaries holding together the different parts or constituencies of a
system, but they also agitate symbols of legitimacy. The link between struc-
ture and convention is provided by the process of selection of multi-status
oligarchs for the renegotiation of rules of the game. Social mechanisms also
contribute heavily to governance, especially when all members tend to take
part in regulatory activities, that is in the reformulation of formal or informal
rules and conventions.
This means that ÔconventionÕ cannot be equated only with ÔruleÕ in order to
create a narrow bridge between structural sociology and Ôconomie des
conventionsÕ. This reduction is only an analytical ÔmomentÕ in the use of the
concept of convention by sociologists trying to understand the coexistence of
multiplex social exchange and market exchange. The notion of convention
shows how actors, even competitors, meet and organize their cooperation. But
conventions develop in a context that is relationally and symbolically struc-
tured. Existing conventions thus need to be differentiated from creation of new
conventions. Dynamics of structures play a role in this differentiation.
Therefore there is a need to differentiate between new conventions
(endogenous rules, for example) and old conventions (embedded norms, for
example). In effect, relational structures are also the product of multiple and
symbolic determinations (old, exogenous and embedded norms as well as new
and endogenous rules) that coexist in these structures in spite of their hetero-
geneity. It would be unfortunate to hide this heterogeneity under the label of
ÔinstitutionÕ or ÔconventionÕ, not only because of the fact of normative ambi-
guities and of multiplexities, but also because this heterogeneity creates room
for structural dynamics.
A dynamic approach to conventions and structures needs to leave behind a
narrow form of interactionism that does not take into account the multilateral,
multiplex and multi-level dimensions of relational structures. This leads to the
necessity to distinguish rules as the product of the aggregation and combina-
tion of ties into a multiplex structure from rules that create ties and structures.
Regulating interactions creates structures and in such structures actors elabo-
rate further, Ôsecond orderÕ, rules and conventions. This is compatible with an
approach that looks at multi-level social mechanisms. Generalized exchange,
lateral control and other mechanisms can be derived from relational invest-
ments that themselves use opinions, ideas, representations and norms: they
have an institutional dimension. But their multi-level character indicates that
they also emerge from an aggregation of elementary structures that pre-exist:
dyadic and triadic ties. They are thus second order institutions, products of
actors confronted by this specific structure combining primary elementary
substructures.
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In many ways, a relationship is not only a conduit for resources, but already
an expression of values that it ÔrepresentsÕ or of Ôfirst orderÕ rules and conven-
tions that it enacts. In that sense, the connection between relational structures
and convention is more direct than a connection that only depends on the notions
of precarious values and multi-status oligarchs. This can be taken into account
even if structural sociologists concerned with collective action may be more
interested in focusing on Ôsecond orderÕ rules and conventions because they are
the product of politicized behaviour of members who are confronted by the rela-
tional structure that emerged (at least partly) from their previous interactions.
Conventions and institutions on which economists focus both emerge from
and produce relational environments that are themselves the product of previ-
ous conventions and institutions, for example exogenous norms. These rela-
tional environments are multiplex, multilateral, and they produce multi-level
social processes that are necessary for collective action. In effect, interdepen-
dent actors participate in and corner themselves by participating in
(re)constructing constraining structures and then take advantage of opportuni-
ties offered by these constraining structures. Structural sociology becomes a
sociology of change that is able to focus on second order conventions itera-
tively (but not mechanically) generating new cycles of structuration based on
conventions. Behind social mechanisms, there are actions and investments in
relationships, social niche building and status competition that produce new
structures embedded in older and mature ones.
ÔEconomie des conventionsÕ is a theory that helps combine social and
market exchange. In effect, conventions need multilateral and multiplex rela-
tional structures in which they become appropriate. Much more remains to be
done, however, in order to exploit this rapprochement. Both conventions and
structures change, and it is ultimately in the evolution of organizations and
markets that their combination makes most sense.
NOTES
1. We thank Lise Mounier and Sbastien Delarre for suggestions made on a first draft of this
text.
2. Our emphasis on conventions comes from the fact they are at the same time one kind of rule
(informal, and so on) thoroughly studied by Lewis (1969) and an interpretive component of
all kinds of rule, the importance of which is stressed in the research programme of
Ôconomie des conventionsÕ (see Favereau, 1999, 2001b).
3. This text summarizes and simplifies ideas and examples relevant to this topic that can be
found in previous work (Lazega 1992, 2001).
4. There is, however, disagreement among structural sociologists about the extent to which a
formal organizational structure has to exist for networks of ties to be able to help generate
collective action.
5. For developments of the ideas sketched in the next two paragraphs, see Favereau (1999,
2001b).
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6. The notion of Ômulti-status oligarchÕ is also quite interesting, from the point of view of joint
research in the two paradigms, because it stresses the role of certain individuals, occupying
certain situations, in alleviating the obstacles to the process of organizational learning.
7. For instance, conventionalist economics is currently trying to grasp Ôcoordination failuresÕ
and Ôreproduction failuresÕ in a common framework (see Favereau, 2001a): network models
would have much to bring, in order to put concrete flesh on these conceptual bones.
8. Thus the interpretation of internal labour markets as an intertemporal exchange of promises
suggested by Doeringer (1986), after Akerlof (1982) and extended by conventionalist
economics (see Favereau, 1999) is a striking example of interpenetration of barter exchange
and market exchange.
9. Eymard-Duvernay insists more on judgments and conventions about quality. There may be
a general problem with having the same vocabulary to cover all forms of coordinations: most
relations are not contractual ex ante because the contract often emerges in the interaction.
But this vocabulary is nevertheless used because it is understood by economists.
10. Rather, resources are seen through distributed cognition. The environment is full of
resources; but one does not need to know everything about them to act in an efficient way.
One needs to know how to rely on knowledge dispersed in the environment. But there is no
attention here to the structure as a pattern of resource interdependencies allowing for verti-
cal or horizontal coordination.
11. Differences remain nevertheless. North uses only one sense of the word ÔconventionÕ, that
of informal rules. He does not believe that formal rules create problems of interpretation. His
is a very macro vision of coordination; the actor never actually shows up, never actually
negotiates the rules of the game, and we do not know where his dynamics come from, while
ÔEconomy of ConventionsÕ starts closer to actors.
12. This approach is consistent with the theory of appropriateness judgments sketched above.
Members manage their resources through choices of exchange partners and interactively elab-
orate appropriate information as well as a supposedly shared, legitimate and validated Ôdefi-
nition of the situationÕ (Lazega, 1990, 1992). Judgment of appropriateness and relational
structure are linked by the concepts of identity, status and authority. Sociocultural conventions
from which to construct solutions to economic problems must be transmitted, and validated
by others. Conventions are rooted in authority relationships, as well as in routines.
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